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The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear facilities[1] are 
 
responsible for producing and maintaining the U.S.' nuclear weapons  
 
arsenal.  Spread at dispersed locations across the U.S and developed 
 
over the five decades since World War II, these facilities have contributed 
 
to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal's successful deterrence of nuclear  
 
attacks against the U.S. and have also promoted scientific research in areas  
 
besides nuclear weapons research.  Responsibility for nuclear weapons work  
 
at these facilities is divided into four categories: 
 
A. Weapons research and development at New Mexico's Los Alamos 
 
and Sandia National Laboratories and California's Lawrence Liver- 
 
more National Laboratory; 
 
B. Nuclear materials production and processing (plutonium and 
 
tritium) at Washington's Hanford Plant and South Carolina's Savannah 
 
River site and uranium processing at Ohio's Feed Materials Pro- 
 
duction Center and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; 
 
C. Warhead component production at Colorado's Rocky Flats Plant, 
 
Tennessee's Y-12 Plant, Ohio's Mound Plant, Florida's Pinellas 
 
Plant, Missouri's Kansas City Plant, and Texas' Pantex Plant  
 






D. Warhead testing at the Nevada Test Site.[2] 
 
Besides nuclear weapons research, DOE laboratories also conduct  
 
scientific research in areas such as biomedicine, high-performance  
 
computing, and environmental restoration which benefit from normal 
 
scientific exchange between Americans and foreign scientists.  The 33 DOE  
 
labs have 56,000 employees, an annual budget of approximately $6.5 billion,  
 
and had received 63 Nobel prizes as of late 1997.   Such scientific inter-  
 
action has seen a steady increase in the number of foreign nationals visiting  
 




This influx of foreign visitors and employees at DOE labs is a 
 
natural outgrowth of scientific research's global nature.  It's 
 
statutory authorization derives from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
 
which called for international cooperation in developing peaceful 
 
uses of nuclear energy.  Additional provisions of this act provide 
 
for classifying and controlling weapons information and a prohibition 
 








benefits and facilitated international cooperation as provided for by the 
 
authorizing statute.  Unfortunately, the agencies and facilities executing 
 
this statute's requirements have been less attentive to and successful in  
 
fulfilling their statutory requirements to protect the security of this 
 
information from unauthorized users. 
 
Concern over DOE nuclear weapons information security dates back at 
 
least two decades.  It has built steadily since then, culminating in a  
 
crescendo of reports during 1999 documenting grievous security lapses and  
 
the hemorrhaging of crucial national security information from DOE  
 
labs to potentially hostile foreign governments.  An early expression of  
 
concern over possible security problems involving foreign visitors at 
 
DOE labs was expressed in an April 1979 General Accounting Office  
 
(GAO) report.  This report warned that it was impossible to estimate the 
 
role played by U.S. nuclear training of foreign scientists in spreading 
 
nuclear proliferation and that there was no way to determine the true 
 
intentions of foreign nationals trained in the U.S. or the motivations 
 
of their countries in having them receive such training.[5] 
 
Recommendations made in this report to enhance nuclear weapons 
 




of government publications capable of providing substantial assistance 
 
to anyone seeking a nuclear weapons capability, clarifying specific 
 
data or information subject to sensitive nuclear technology export 
 
criteria in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, and considering home country  
 
adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty in selecting foreign nationals 
 
to participate in and receive fellowships from U.S. Government nuclear 
 
research programs.[6]  An additional demonstration of this report's concern  
 
with security is provided by the following admonition: 
 
Although aliens may have an important role in advancing U.S.  
 
nuclear research and development, the Secretary of Energy should 
 
reassess foreign participation at Government-owned nuclear research 
 
facilities and limit, where appropriate, participation that could be 
 




These security concerns would receive heightened emphasis in 
 
another GAO report three years later.  This document determined that some 
 
DOE labs did not control sensitive items despite their susceptibility to theft, 
 
properly identify or tag items, adequately account for items, or document 
 




of two labs of excluding items costing $500 or more from sensitive 
 
property controls even though such items would appear to be more  
 
vulnerable to theft.[8]  
 
Further concern over security and long-term development at DOE labs  
 
would be expressed as the 1980's progressed.  Hearings before the House 
 
Energy and Commerce Committee in 1987 and 1988 revealed safety  
 
problems such as radiation releases and deficient fire protection at DOE  
 
nuclear facilities.  An equally troubling revelation of these hearings saw 
 
DOE weapons site workers threatened with losing security clearances 
 
or termination if they reported safety and other concerns to U.S. Government 
 
agencies including Congress.[9]  Concern over the future of DOE's nuclear 
 
complex led Congress to require a presidential report on the future structure 
 
of this complex in 1988 and 1989 defense authorization legislation.[10] 
 
Congressional concern was also expressed over what it saw as the  
 
decreasing importance of DOE's Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs 
 
and the Defense Department (DOD) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
 
for Atomic Energy offices with both of these offices having nuclear security 
 
responsibilities.[11]      
 




visitors program, GAO provided further documentation of its concerns 
 
with its October 1988 report Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Major Weaknesses  
 
in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories. Findings from this 
 
document indicate that DOE granted nearly 6,700 foreign nationals access 
 
to its weapons laboratories between January 1986 and September 1987.   
 
These visitors included 222 from communist countries and 675 from other 
 
sensitive countries.  From this total, GAO randomly selected and reviewed  
 




GAO went on to chronicle serious foreign visitors program weaknesses. 
 
It mentioned that DOE failed to follow its own requirements and obtain 
 
background information on visitors from communist or sensitive countries, 
 
its failure to use available data for prescreening visitors from foreign 
 
facilities suspected of nuclear weapons related activities, failing to 
 
identify and review all visits involving sensitive weapons related subjects, 
 
not considering a number of weapons related activities as sensitive 
 
subjects, failing to enforce various internal control requirements for 
 
approving, monitoring, and reporting foreign visits, and the absence 
 






GAO reports continued to document DOE security problems in the 
 
early 1990's.  A 1991 report warned that DOE information systems 
 
containing important data about security weaknesses and incidents  
 
possessed limited analytical capabilities and unreliable information. 
 
This predicament was compounded by DOE's failure to perform a  
 
comprehensive assessment of its information and information technology 
 
needs as applied to its security program.  GAO asserted such assessment 
 
was needed to ensure the coordination and focus of departmental  
 
information resources capable of achieving DOE security goals and 
 
sharing or transferring data.[14] 
 
Two years later, another GAO report evaluated DOE's security clearance 
 
program praising its personnel security clearance backlog reduction from 
 
nearly 135,000 cases in 1988 to 1,033 cases in 1993 along with its reduction 
 
of clearances issued from 220,000 in 1986 to 174,000 in 1992.[15]  
 
However, GAO also criticized DOE for not focusing sufficient management 
 
attention on preemployment screening of potential employees,   
 
ineffective management of cases involving questionable employee  
 




contractors preemployment investigation of prospective employees.[16] 
 
The mid-1990's saw increased international visitation to DOE labs 
 
with the percentage of average annual visits by foreign nationals increasing 
 
by over 50% from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.[17]  A September 1997 
 
GAO study showed that out of 5,472 visits to the Los Alamos, Livermore, 
 
and Sandia Laboratories between 1994-1996, by visitors from sensitive 
 
countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia, background checks were 
 
performed for only 892 or 16% of these visitors.[18] 
 
This same study also detailed additional problems.  These included 
 
DOE's failure to follow its procedures requiring foreign visitor back- 
 
ground checks, Los Alamos and Sandia obtaining a partial exemption 
 
to DOE  Order 1240.2B in 1994 thus essentially avoiding the background  
 
check process, giving foreign visitors unescorted 24-hour access to  
 
controlled area facilities, boxes marked as containing sensitive material  
 
being left in a foreign visitor accessible hallway, classified information  
 
being included in a newsletter sent to 11 foreign nationals, and DOE  
 
counterintelligence programs not being based on a comprehensive threat  
 






Concern over possible foreign espionage at DOE labs, as documented 
 
by reports such as this, prompted the House of Representatives to approve 
 
the formation of a special investigative committee on June 18, 1998 to  
 
examine these security concerns.[20]  Chaired by Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA), 
 
the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/ 
 
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China worked  
 
throughout 1998 before releasing a classified version of its report in 
 
January 1999 and an unclassified version in May 1999.[21] 
 
Representing the first in a series of blasts against DOE security 
 
practices, the Cox Report contained a number of serious charges within 
 
its three volumes.  It argued that Chinese espionage at DOE laboratories  
 
dates from the late 1970s and continues to the present, that China had stolen  
 
design information on the U.S' most advanced nuclear weapons along with 
 
classified information on all currently deployed nuclear warheads including  
 
the W-88 warhead on Trident submarine D-5 ballistic missiles, and design  
 
and other classified information on neutron bomb warheads.  Additional  
 
report determinations include Chinese intelligence collection efforts  
 
targeting Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, and Sandia  
 




its next generation of nuclear warheads, that stolen U.S. nuclear secrets  
 
enable China's nuclear weapons capabilities to match the U.S.', facilitate the  
 
enhancement of mobile Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),  
 
and that counterintelligence programs at DOE weapons laboratories fail to  
 
meet even minimal standards.[22] 
 
Select committee recommendations to repair such damages included 
 
requiring a semiannual presidential report on Chinese espionage and  
 
responsive and preventative steps taken by various U.S. Government  
 
agencies to this espionage, drastically enhancing DOE's counterintelligence 
 
capability, congressional examination of whether DOE should retain its 
 
nuclear weapons responsibilities, and the need for intelligence community 
 
compliance with the National Security Act and congressional insistence 
 
on strict adherence to this statute.  Additional Cox recommendations 
 
include advocating Chinese compliance with the Missile Technology 
 
Control Regime (MTCR), greater U.S. MTCR enforcement leadership, 
 
giving the State Department sole satellite licensing authority, and new 
 
legislation to improve sensitive law enforcement information sharing 
 
within the U.S. Government's executive branch.[23]  
 




Wen-Ho Lee, a Los Alamos employee, was arrested on charges of  
 
performing espionage for China.[24]  Another assault on DOE laboratory 
 
security came in June 1999 from the President's Council on Foreign 
 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).   This organization advises 
 
the President on intelligence-related issues and had been charged 
 
by President Clinton with reviewing the adequacy of DOE laboratory 
 
security March 18, 1999.[25]      
 
Chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), PFIAB's 
 
report also excoriated the lax security at DOE laboratories.  PFIAB 
 
determined that DOE weapons laboratories have been and remain major 
 
targets of foreign intelligence agencies, open-source information on 
 
these DOE facilities alone reveals their security and counterintelligence 
 
operations receiving low priority for decades, organizational disarray, 
 
managerial neglect, and an arrogant culture have created an espionage 
 
scandal waiting to happen, that the subtlety and skill of Chinese intelligence 
 
gathering methods are particularly challenging for the U.S. and its 
 
weapons laboratories, that DOE is a dysfunctional bureaucracy incapable 
 
of reform, that minimum qualifications for the Secretary of Energy include 
 




change in DOE's institutional culture and attitude toward security.[26] 
 
Rudman panel recommendations include DOE laboratories recognizing 
 
that national nuclear stockpile and nuclear secrets protection are its fore- 
 
most priorities, the need for independent oversight of weapons laboratories, 
 
replacing the 15 congressional committees currently overseeing weapons  
 
laboratories with a single joint committee, the CIA and FBI expanding  
 
their activity to include the weapons facilities, and a more effective  
 
personnel security program with clear and attainable thresholds for  
 
suspending clearances with cause that includes pending criminal  
 
investigations.  Additional recommendations include establishing a 
 
comprehensive weapons lab cyber-security program, developing a  
 
comprehensive classified document control system and classification 
 
review, and continuing the foreign visitors program but ensuring tighter 
 
security standards such as clear demarcation between secure and 
 
open areas at labs and firm guidelines for weapons lab employee contacts 
 
with foreign visitors from sensitive countries.[27]  
 
DOE did not remain oblivious to these security concerns.  It's 
 
Office of Safeguards and Security issued a report in 1999 that gave 
 




Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge's Y-12 plant, and Rocky Flats 
 
in areas such as protection program operations, information security, 
 
nuclear materials control and accountability, and personnel security.[28] 
 
A more official policy statement from DOE came with a July 14, 1999 
 
memorandum from Energy Secretary Bill Richardson.  This document 
 
listed new policies and procedures for DOE to follow in regards to  
 
unclassified  visits and assignments by foreign nationals at DOE facilities. 
 
Richardson's memorandum rescinded DOE order 1240.2B along with 
 
its foreign visitor exemptions and waivers.  The new directive N 142.1  
 
establishes the Energy Secretary's authority as the sole official responsible 
 
for approving visits and assignments for foreign nationals from countries 
 
the State Department identifies as terrorist nations, requiring security plans 
 
for all unclassified foreign visits and assignments to secure areas at DOE 
 
facilities, delegating approval authority for foreign visits and assignments 
 
to DOE or contractor site managers, and requiring the involvement of local 
 




These DOE efforts, though, could not diminish the consequences of 
 




prevent such activity despite two decades worth of reports documenting 
 
DOE's manifold security vulnerabilities.  This failure to provide an effective  
 
response to long-term and growing foreign intelligence efforts to  
 
acquire sensitive technologies with national security applications[30] 
 
produced increasing congressional criticism of an already embattled agency 
 
and prompted the introduction of legislation to overhaul U.S. nuclear  
 
weapons management during the summer of 1999.  
 
Concern over the foreign visitors program reached congressional radar 
 
screens before issuance of the unclassified Cox and PFIAB reports.  On 
 
March 25, 1999, Rep. Jim Ryun (R-KS) introduced H.R. 1348 whose  
 
provisions included establishing a moratorium on the foreign visitors 
 
program and requiring the creation of counterintelligence programs at 
 
DOE laboratories.[31]  Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), the chair of the  
 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, introduced a companion version of  
 
Ryun's bill on April 27, 1999.[32] 
 
Various congressional committees conducted hearings on Cox and  
 
Rudman report findings during the summer of 1999 in an effort to obtain 
 
additional information on DOE security breakdowns and seek possible 
 




agency to oversee DOE nuclear facilities.  During a July 13, 1999 House 
 
Commerce Committee hearing on this issue, Rep. Heather Wilson (R-NM), 
 
whose district includes the Sandia National Laboratory, observed that  
 
despite the voluminous literature on DOE lab security problems little 
 
fundamental security improvement had been achieved and that it was  
 
necessary for DOE and Congress to try more radical reforms.[33] 
 
Wilson went on to assert that three principles must guide any DOE 
 
nuclear security reform proposals: 
 
1. Any legislation must strengthen management lines of authority 
 
and accountability, not just move boxes around on an organizat- 
 
ional chart.  This must be about changing the way that our nuc- 
 
lear programs are managed and strengthening the authority of 
 
those in a clearly defined chain of command. 
 
2. Our multi-program laboratories must continue to be able to do 
 
work on a wide range of subjects for many customers.  Fully one  
 
third of the work conducted at our national laboratories is not 
 
for the nuclear weapons program.... 
 
3. The independent agency within the DOE must have necessary 
 




Another important hearing was conducted by the House Government 
 
Reform Committee on June 24, 1999.  This hearing examined whether 
 
advocates of stricter security controls at DOE and the Defense Department 
 
received personnel sanctions for favoring enhanced security measures. 
 
Edward McCallum, the Director of DOE's Office of Safeguards and 
 
Security testified that several DOE security officers responded to former 
 
Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary's 1994 call to report security deficiencies 
 
without fear of reprisal only to suffer disciplinary sanctions afterwards. 
 
McCallum also maintained that a long-serving DOE Security Director 
 
retired in 1999 after attempting to take action against an employee who 
 
violated security procedures and admitted a Russian visitor with an  
 
uncleared laptop computer into a secure area at the Savannah River 
 
site despite being warned against this by the Security Office.[35] 
 
Another witness, Peter Leitner of the Defense Threat Reduction 
 
Agency, testified that he received poor performance evaluations and 
 
financial penalties for his work denying export license applications 
 
originating with DOE laboratories which he believed would transfer 
 
equipment with nuclear weapons application to Russia.  Such sanctions 
 




Chinese efforts to obtain U.S. nuclear technology which he contended 
 




Legislation introduced by Ryun and Shelby, testimony from the  
 
aforementioned and other hearings, Cox and Rudman Report findings, 
 
the Thompson-Lieberman investigation, and congressional displeasure 
 
at Clinton Administration national security policy and DOE's past 
 
security performance, contributed to a significant revamping of DOE 
 
nuclear facilities within the 2000 defense authorization bill.  The 
 
conference committee report for this legislation was published on 
 
August 6, 1999.   
 
This document proposed the creation of a new agency within DOE to 
 
address these long-standing security deficiencies. Referring to DOE's well- 
 
documented security problems, conferees proposed the following treatment: 
 
To correct these systemic problems, the conferees agree to establish 
 
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-auton- 
 
omous agency within the Department that would be responsible for 
 
nuclear weapons development, naval nuclear propulsion, defense 
 




security, counterintelligence, and intelligence offices; and prescribe 
 




Congress also endowed the NNSA with numerous institutional  
 
characteristics.  The agency would be part of DOE and headed by 
 
an Under Secretary for Nuclear Security appointed by the President 
 
and subject to Senate confirmation.  The Secretary of Energy would 
 
be responsible for developing and promoting departmental security, 
 
intelligence, and counterintelligence policies and establish  DOE  
 
counterintelligence and intelligence offices.  NNSA's mission would be 
 
enhancing national security through military application of nuclear  
 
energy and reducing global danger from mass destruction weapons.[38] 
 
Additional congressional mandates for NNSA include its administrator 
 
establishing policies and procedures to ensure maximum protection for 
 
classified information in its possession, the counterintelligence and 
 
intelligence offices being headed by a senior Federal Bureau of Investi- 
 
gation (FBI) executive with counterintelligence experience, and a re- 
 
quirement that this official submit an annual report to the Energy Secretary,  
 




committees on the effectiveness of DOE facilities counterintelligence  
 
efforts in classified and unclassified versions.  Other stipulations  
 
include NNSA establishment of procedures prohibiting individuals 
 
without security clearances from having unescorted access to any 
 
classified area or access to classified information, users of NNSA 
 
computers having no privacy expectations in their use of government 
 
computers, and administration submission of annual reports to con- 
 
gressional defense committees on special access programs with 
 
such reports containing budgetary and discussion information on these 
 




This legislation became law on October 5, 1999 when President Clinton 
 
signed the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Act.  In signing the  
 
legislation, though, Clinton expressed strong concerns about provisions 
 
dealing with NNSA including what he asserted was congress' intent to 
 
isolate NNSA personnel and contractors from outside direction, limit the 
 
Secretary of Energy's ability to appoint subordinates to direct NNSA 
 
activities, and concerns dealing with U.S. policy toward China.[40] 
 




when House Armed Services Committee Chair Rep. Floyd Spence (R-SC) 
 
announced the appointment of an oversight panel chaired by Rep. Mac 
 
Thornberry (R-TX) on DOE reorganization.  This panel was charged with 
 
working with Secretary Richardson to ensure that DOE security reforms 
 
contained in the defense authorization legislation were carried out.[41] 
 
The goals of DOE's Foreign Visitors Program in promoting international 
 
scientific research and cooperation are laudable.  Evidence of the program's 
 
success in these objectives are the numerous Nobel Prizes awarded to DOE 
 
lab personnel and the opportunity it has provided for numerous foreign  
 
nationals to enhance their scientific expertise for their own professional 
 
benefit and the advancement of scientific research in their countries. 
 
Unfortunately for the U.S. and its national security interests, this  
 
openness and the desire to promote enhanced international understanding 
 
of nuclear science, created a climate in which security over militarily 
 
sensitive material was effectively ignored by DOE personnel, by DOE 
 
predecessor agencies personnel, and postwar presidential administrations.   
 
This lackadaisical approach to security was exploited by individuals from  
 
nations such as China that do not share the U.S.' lofty ideals of free and open  
 




Without access to classified Chinese, foreign, or U.S. intelligence 
 
assessments of the value of stolen U.S. nuclear secrets, estimating the 
 
exact impact and cost of this espionage on U.S. national security is im- 
 
possible.  Cox report findings about the loss of these secrets in the area of  
 
Chinese nuclear warhead technology acquisition alone are alarming. 
 
The creation of the NNSA and other reforms contained in the just-passed  
 
defense authorization legislation need time for implementation, regular and 
 
effective congressional oversight, and funding to determine their efficacy. 
 
Ongoing cooperation between Congress and present and future presidential  
 
administrations is also required if  U.S. nuclear information security is to be  
 
enhanced.  Rep. Wilson's advocacy of the need for strengthened DOE  
 
management accountability on security issues is of particular importance in  
 
future policy developments concerning DOE lab security. 
 
The foreign visitors program should continue but with much tougher 
 
security oversight and the swift imposition of stringent criminal penalties 
 
for violations committed by DOE personnel or foreign visitors.  The  
 
program should also restrict access to sensitive information and work areas 
 
to cleared visitors from countries with which the U.S. has a formal military 
 




contractors inculcate an attitude in which protecting sensitive information 
 
becomes of paramount importance even if it is at the expense of the 
 
ideal of enhancing international scientific information exchange.  Congress  
 
should also examine the feasibility of establishing a direct link between lab  
 




DOE's foreign visitors program illustrates the consequences of ignoring 
 
the security issues involved in working with vital national security  
 
information.  Such inattention to security has already proven costly to U.S. 
 
national security although the full cost can not be determined without 
 
access to classified U.S. and foreign intelligence assessments or knowledge 
 
of the results of future national security crises involving the U.S.   
 
Revelation of foreign espionage at DOE labs reminds us that the U.S.  
 
remains vulnerable to a variety of national security threats and that not all  
 
individuals and nations share the U.S.' often idyllic goals about the free and  
 
open exchange of scientific and other information. 
 
The saga of espionage at DOE labs should also give pause to those  
 
advocating the immediate and wholesale declassification of voluminous  
 




that there are individuals, organizations, and nations who will attempt to use  
 
such information to threaten U.S. national security interests, the physical  
 
security of Americans, and the security of people from nations allied with  
 
the U.S.   Sober acceptance of this reality should be incumbent on all of us  
 
working with government information and desirous of enhancing public  
 
access to such resources. 
 
It should also foster a professional and ethical commitment by depository 
 
librarians to strive for a more pragmatic and accountable approach to gov- 
 
ernment information access.  This approach acknowledges the desirability 
 
of complete and uncensored access to government information while recog- 
 
nizing the serious intellectual and moral consequences of unauthorized indi- 
 
viduals and groups gaining access to sensitive information whose declassifi- 
 
cation and release has not been authorized by requisite governmental  
 
authority.  Adopting and adhering to this pragmatic and balanced assessment  
 
of government information access represents an intellectually credible and  
 
professionally sound way for depository librarians to enter the new  
 
millenium as exponents of a more informed citizenry. 
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